

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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REVIEWED *Boehm Date 4/14/64*

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TO: The Secretary  
THROUGH: S/S *mwm*  
FROM: EUR - Foy D. Kohler *fk*  
SUBJECT: Thompson-Gromyko Talks on Berlin

ER

4-4-64

There is attached a revised version of possible instructions to Ambassador Thompson for a next round with Gromyko, together with a slightly modified draft of proposed supplementary and unilateral US instructions. As you know, I believe that Tommy should see Gromyko once more before the Geneva meetings. If you concur, I would like to give copies of the basic instructions to the British and Germans tomorrow with a view to having Tommy see Gromyko as early as possible next week.

I will be sending advance copies of the attachments to Mac Bundy.  
Concurrence:

I have seen and approved  
S/B - Mr. Bohlen *LB*

Attachments:

Tab A - Instructions to Amb. Thompson (revised) (*misery*)  
Tab B - Proposed supplementary, unilateral US instructions.

(1)

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

EYES ONLY ATTACHMENT  
03145507230  
S/0:EUR:GER:M:Willebrand:all  
2/26/62

CONFIDENTIAL BY NAME

*Eyes Only*

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ACTION: Embassy MOSCOW

EYES ONLY FROM SECRETARY

1. You will be receiving agreed tripartite instructions in separate cable, and should now request early meeting with Gromyko. This message contains my supplementary instructions.
2. I continue to be in some doubt about present Soviet intentions and tactics, and have found disturbing the willingness to agitate air access situation--area which they must know to be delicate and highly volatile. At same time they have so far shown disinclination to go beyond limited point of threat and harassment thus reducing risk of escalation. I must assume that Soviets are at least partially motivated by desire to pressure us in present discussions by underlining fragility of existing access arrangements and their capacity to harass us at will. Presumably action has also been related to campaign for mid-March summit meeting in Geneva. It is clear that we must not permit Soviets to obtain impression they can soften our negotiating position by threats and actions against Berlin access. At same time we have had certain objectives in your discussions with Gromyko at least some of which, to extent they remain pertinent, we still hope to pursue.
3. In light of current situation our objectives now seem to be:
  - a. to warn Soviet authorities of serious implications of harassments in air corridors;
  - b. to avoid

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND CIA  
REVIEWED BY [Signature]

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- b. to avoid break-off of discussions before Secretary has opportunity to see Gromyko at Geneva (on assumption Soviets will eventually accept idea of meeting at Foreign Ministers' level).
- c. to continue to probe for any flexibility in Soviet position, notably in regard to variations in Access Authority proposal and willingness to treat issue of legal status sub silentie;
- d. to try to turn their thinking to kind of arrangement President suggested to Adzhubei, which would meet immediate problems we face in Berlin without purporting to settle issue for all time and which would open way for progress on other issues.
4. It seems evident that French intransigence will continue, and we have now reached point where we must realistically conclude that, within current framework of discussions with Soviets, it will be impossible to meet French prerequisite for their participation in negotiations. This dilemma is one to which we are now giving consideration; it obviously presents serious difficulties if we think of any subsequent negotiations with Soviets in terms of conventional Four-Power meetings at the present time.
5. Another pertinent factor at this point is need to maintain maximum public support for our position. We consider it likely that Soviets will eventually publish various documents they have handed you in course of talks, and we are prepared to do same with documents you have given Gromyko. In considering problem of creating public understanding our position, we have concluded that all Berlin ~~which~~ does not have appeal of International Access Authority

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proposal

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proposal in terms of inherent plausibility and appeal to world opinion. We are accordingly planning to launch campaign of public statements and publicity through available media about virtue and necessity of International Access Authority. This publicity campaign would take into consideration desirability of not destroying any vague possibility that Soviets would be willing to consider some modification of Access Authority. It would also be directed to possibility that, if Soviets will have nothing to do with Access Authority, they might decide, in face of growing Western demand for improvement in status quo, their interests would be best served by reciprocal abandonment of Free City and Access Authority proposals.

6. You will have noted general reference in para 5 of basic instructions to point made by President to Adzhubei. We have not fully informed other countries of details President's discussion as contained in DEPTEL 1780 (MEMCON dated January 31, 1962, pouches Moscow). If, in your judgment, however, occasion seems propitious to probe on question posed by Adzhubei on access, you may note that on personal basis Adzhubei did seem to imply there might be some Soviet interest in having question of access supervised by International Commission. You would be willing to explore this matter further if Soviets wish to develop their thinking on subject.

7. With respect to point contained memorandum handed Grusky on February 1 and in para 8 of new basic instructions, if you deem it useful, you may amplify our meaning by observing that what we are asking Soviets is that they consider agreement on specific practical issue which will confront us if they pursue

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course they have projected, namely access issue. We do not want to get into legalistic discussion with them as to differing views of both sides on status. We want merely to deal pragmatically with factual problems arising out of announced Soviet intentions.

8. For reasons given para 15 DEPTEL 1616 we are somewhat reluctant at this time to have you raise question of all-Berlin confederation as suggested your 2186.

9. In view of approach your next meeting outlined in basic instructions, and above, do not REPEAT NOT believe you should use contingency instructions contained DEPTEL 1768.

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